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Despite decades of development of formal tools for modelling legal knowledge and reasoning, the creation of a fully fledged legal
decision support system remains challenging. Among those challenges, such system requires an enormous amount of commonsense
knowledge to derive legal expertise. This paper describes the development of a negotiation decision support system (the Parenting
Plan Support System or PPSS) to support parents in drafting an agreement (the parenting plan) for the exercise of parental custody
of minor children after a divorce is granted. The main objective here is to discuss problems of framing an intuitively appealing and
computationally efficient knowledge base that can adequately represent the indeterminate legal concept of thewell-being of the child
in the context of continental legal culture and of Polish law in particular. In addition to commonsense reasoning, interpretation of
such a concept demands both legal expertise and significant professional knowledge from other domains.
1. Introduction
From their inception, expert systems have been seen as a
suitable tool for decision support in legal contexts [1, 2].
However, while the first attempts to create such systems
seemed promising [3], deeper inquiry revealed a number of
difficulties [4]. While it is not our concern here to elaborate
the problems associated with the representation of legal
knowledge in computer systems, it is our opinion that the
most difficult task in that context is to model the com-
monsense knowledge and contextual reasoning mechanisms
widely used by legal practitioners. Without such elements,
expert systems could only be used to support decisions in the
most trivial cases. A few important aspects of the modelling
of commonsense knowledge in legal decision support systems
are worthy of further discussion here: the modelling of
indeterminate concepts widely used in legal practice and the
representation of commonsense rules reflecting the mode of
reasoning used by human lawyers. It is trivial to observe
that commonsense rules differ from strict, logic-based rules
in that they are, for instance, usually defeasible, uncertain,
and sometimes conflicting. The nature of such rules and the
relations between them has long been a topic of debate ([5, 6]
and many others).
Among many and varied previous conceptions of legal
decision support tools ([3, 7] and others), we will focus here
on one specific approach in developing a tool to support
negotiation between parents in drafting a plan for parental
custody arrangements forminor children following a divorce.
In particular, the present paper describes our attempt to
formalise currently informal mechanisms for evaluation of
a child’s well-being, which requires some discussion of
salient aspects of the formalisation of legal and common-
sense knowledge. Appropriate utilisation of various forms of
negation as well as determination of orders between rules
is crucial for the accuracy of models of knowledge. The
main objective here is to discuss how an intuitively appealing
and computationally efficient knowledge base can be framed
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to deal with such indeterminate legal concepts and how
the preference relations between rules used to interpret this
concept in concrete cases can be determined.
The present investigation is structured as follows.
Section 2 outlines the structure of the Parenting Plan Support
System (PPSS). Section 3 compares PPSS with existing online
dispute resolution systems (mainly those dealing with issues
of family law) and details the research problem here.
Section 4 considers the possibility of generalising features of
individual cases from a practical legal perspective, referring
mainly to civil law culture, where, in principle, there are no
binding precedents or derived argumentative schemes. In
Section 5, the notion of heuristics as understood in cognitive
science is discussed, as well as the kinds of move used in
the AI and law literature to establish preference relations
between the elements of relevant knowledge bases. Section 6
presents a technical discussion of the syntax of defeasible
rules—that is, the possibility of utilisation of negation in
their antecedents—and discusses the notion of preference
between rules. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2. The Parenting Plan Support System
PPSS [8–10], partially implemented in [11], is a negotiation
decision support system to support parents in drafting an
agreement (the parenting plan) to govern their exercise of
parental custody over minor children after a divorce is
granted under Polish law.
2.1. The Parenting Plan: Legal and Conceptual Context. In
a divorce judgment, the Polish family court determines
parental authority over a minor child and parties’ contact
with the child, and issues regarding the financial costs of
maintenance and raising the child are decided. The court
recognises such an agreement between the spouses only if it
is consistent with the “well-being of the child.”The court may
grant parental authority to only one of the parents, confining
the other parent to specified duties and rights in respect
of the child. Alternatively, provided they have submitted a
parenting plan, the court may grant parental authority to
both parents, on the assumption that they will cooperate
on matters regarding the child (art. 58 §1 and 1a of the
Polish Family and Custody Code, hereafter PFCC). A similar
regulation is applicable in the case of unmarried parents
living separately (art. 107 PFCC). In abstract terms, Polish law
does not favour any specific allocation of parental authority;
the issue is always decided on the concrete circumstances of a
case. In this context, it is important to note the constitutional
and statutory principle of the autonomy of parental authority
in Polish law (art. 48 par. 1, art. 53 par. 3, and art. 70 par. 3 of
the Polish Constitution and art. 97 §1 PFCC).
The fundamental issues of relevance to the parenting plan
as agreed by the parents (sometimes with participation of
a third person such as a mediator) are parental authority,
contact between parents and child, and the child’s well-
being. These in turn relate to “background” concepts such as
public interest, the interests of the parents, and the rational
cooperation of parents and child. According to Polish law,
parental authority is to be defined as the duty and right of
the parents to have custody over the person and property of
the child, with due regard to the child’s dignity and rights.
Children subordinate to parental authority owe obedience
to their parents, and even where the children are competent
enough to act independently, they should take into account
their parents’ advice, provided that this advice is formulated
for the sake of the child’s well-being. Parental authority
should be exercised in accordance with the child’s well-being
and with public well-being, and any reasonable wishes of the
child should be taken into account under certain conditions
(art. 95 PFCC). The parents must raise and direct the child
under their parental authority, taking care of the child’s
physical and spiritual development and preparing him or
her to work as a member of society in accordance with his
or her abilities. The child remains under parental authority
until reaching legal maturity, typically at 18 years of age. In
principle, parental authority is vested in both parents (art
92 and 93 PFCC). Independent of parental authority, both
parents and child have the right andduty to remain in contact.
This contact with the child encompasses, inter alia, spending
time with the child, direct communication, and distance
communication (e.g., by means of electronic devices) (art 113
PFCC).
Parental authority should be exercised in accordance with
the child’s well-being, in the public interest (95 §3 PFCC) and
with respect to the dignity and rights of the child as specified
in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted
on 20November 1989). In consequence, the child’s well-being
should be considered central and prerequisite in the exercise
of parental authority and contact between the parties. This is
determined in light of the concrete circumstances of a given
case to ensure the proper personal (spiritual) development of
the child (Order of the Polish SupremeCourt 11 January 2000,
I CKN 327/98).The concept of the child’s well-being relates to
the concept of the prevailing interest of the child, construed
on the basis of the UNConvention on the Rights of the Child
(Preamble to the Convention).
The second major criterion is the public interest. The
child’s upbringing is also a realisation of the parents’ social
function, taking care of the child’s physical and spiritual
development to prepare him or her to work for the benefit
of the society, according to his or her capacities (art. 96 §1
PFCC).TheConvention also takes into account thesematters,
albeit with important caveats (cf. the Convention and the
Resolution of the PSC of 12 June 1992, III CZP 48/92).
As a consequence, in deciding on the issue of parental
authority, the court should be guided first and foremost by
the child’s well-being (with due regard to the public interest)
rather than solely or mainly by the interests of one or both
parents (cf. Resolution of the PSC of 12 June 1992, III CZP
48/92, and Judgment of the PSC of 25 August 1981, III CRN
155/81). The interests of the parents remain important but
cannot be decisive; the court should, if possible, take into
account the position and interests of the parents (Order of the
PSCof 5May 2000, II CKN765/00, andResolution of the PSC
of 09 June 1976, III CZP 46/75). This approach is consistent
with theConvention on theRights of theChild (cf. Resolution
of the PSC of 12 June 1992, III CZP 48/92, and Resolution
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of the PSC of 08 March 2006, III CZP 98/05). The principle
of rational cooperation between parents and child must also
inform the exercise of parental authority (cf. art. 72 par. 3 of
the Polish Constitution, art. 95 §2 and 4 of the PFCC).
Summarising the legal and conceptual context in which
the parenting plan is developed, the following points should
be noted:
(1) If the divorcing parents (or unmarried parents living
apart) intend that parental authority be vested in
both of them, they should prepare an agreement (the
parenting plan) governing their exercise of parental
authority and contact with the child.
(2) The plan is assessed by the court, principally on the
criterion of the child’s well-being and with reasonable
expectations of parental cooperation with regard to
the child. However, the court must also take into
account other criteria, including the public interest
and the interests of the parents.
(3) The plan is in principle adopted as a particular type
of agreement rather than as a formal settlement and
does not entail any substantive legal results. Instead,
the plan is no more than a premise to be taken
into account by the court in order to vest parental
authority in both of the parents. The court alone
is authorised to decide on the rules governing the
exercise of parental authority, and the plan is not
binding on the court.
(4) The plan is approved bymeans of a judgment granting
parental authority to both parents. In cases where the
plan is not accepted the court decides on matters of
parental authority, based on the totality of the case’s
circumstances and taking into account any proposals
submitted by the parents in the plan.
(5) Polish law does not prescribe any particular form or
content for the parenting plan.
The legal context for the decision support system
described in this paper involves rules of law that prescribe no
ready answers to issues arising in drafting a parenting plan.
Presumably, no uniquely “right” plan exists in any concrete
situation, and this legal domain can certainly be characterised
as ill-defined [12]. The system described here aims to revisit
the domain to provide interested parties with a tool that may
be of use in resolving problems that arise in drafting the
parenting plan.
2.2. The Parenting Plan Support System: Functional and
Structural Context. In preparing a parenting plan, the task
for parents is to devise an agreement that can satisfy judicial
assessment of whether it ensures the child’s well-being (as
interpreted in the concrete circumstances) and of whether it
can reasonably be expected to be realised. More specifically,
the functions of such a plan are as follows:
(i) To facilitate regulation of relations between parents
and child following divorce.
(ii) To secure the child’s interests.
(iii) To eliminate any unacceptable behaviour of the par-
ents.
(iv) To educate the parents with regard to pedagogical,
legal, psychological, and social principles informing
their relations with the child.
(v) To prevent future judicial disputes concerning the
child’s well-being.
It is worth noting that this task is made more difficult
because the parents are in conflict and are not usually
professionally equipped to draft a parenting plan.
In determining the content of a parenting plan, the
argumentative discourse exhibits four main dimensions:
communicational, informational, relational, and decisional.
The preferred negotiation strategy is nonadversarial and
cooperative, characterised by a win-win paradigm as against
an adversarial, win-lose competitive approach. The final
version of PPSS should provide the following support for
parents in performing these tasks:
(1) Providing the parties with a template of sufficient
complexity for the parenting plan, adjustable to the
concrete circumstances of a case and with a simple
tutoring module that sets out the functions and aims
of the system.
(2) Enabling users to input salient data concerning the
child and relations between parents and child, as well
as other relevant data.
(3) Including information about the nature of any conflict
between the parents and, in particular, whether that
conflict relates to the parents’ respective values.
(4) Providing the parents with a rich variety of (contex-
tually relevant) options to clarify the scope and limits
of their choice.
(5) Encouraging the parents to adopt a cooperative
attitude by providing suggestions concerning their
choices and possible mutual concessions.
(6) Enabling the negotiating parents to communicate,
allowing them to deliberate directly on some choices
while opting for automated generation of other parts
of the plan.
(7) Establishing the space of agreement concerning con-
textual data provided by the parents, enabling nego-
tiation of options that are mutually acceptable and
mutually advantageous and realistic.
(8) Grounding any suggestions provided by the system
(and ultimately by the negotiated parenting plan) in
an interdisciplinary knowledge base encompassing
psychological, pedagogical, and legal data.
(9) Assessing any options chosen by the parents in terms
of the child’s well-being, in a way that predicts the
likely judicial assessment of the plan.
(10) Generating a final electronic version of the parenting
plan to be submitted to the court. The system should
also be able to update the plan where future circum-
stances change.
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This paper is concerned with the system’s conceptual
architecture rather than its technological aspects. Although
the system has not as yet been fully implemented, some
initial attempts have been made [11]. An important subset
of the system’s knowledge base has been extracted from
thirty actual and influential judgments by the Polish Supreme
Court, yielding a large number of salient factors that will
play a crucial role in the operation of the system, as detailed
below.A case analysis based on an existing (unofficial) sample
form of the parenting plan made it possible to systematise
the content of the parenting plan into ten parts, referred
to as “categories.” Additional special categories—relating,
for instance, to any incapacities of the child—are omitted
here. For each parenting plan, data referred to as Essential
Information must be entered. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume here that the parents have only one child. On that
basis, the structure of the parenting plan is as follows.
Essential information:
(i) Formal (data relating to the parties, important dates,
etc.),
(ii) emotional (relating to emotional relations between
the actors involved),
(iii) implementation (declarations relating to realisation
of the agreement after its execution).
The specific parts of the plan are structured as follows
(more detailed discussion is presented in [8]):
Category 1: contact between parents and the child.
Category 2: contact between the child, family mem-
bers, and other people.
Category 3: education.
Category 4: livelihood.
Category 5: leisure, holidays, and ceremonies.
Category 6: worldview and childrearing rules.
Category 7: child health.
Category 8: information and documentation.
Category 9: proceeding in emergency cases.
Category 10: any other issues.
The list of categories (i.e., issues to be included in
the parenting plan for completeness) is based on informal
templates for such agreements that are used in actual practice.
The structure of the agreement is mirrored in the knowledge
representation structures of PPSS.
2.3. Structure of PPSS. PPSS consists principally of the
following modules:
(i) The Questionnaire asks users to provide basic infor-
mation about their situation (e.g., age and number
of children, income, and familial relationships). The
system suggests answers, but no NLP support is
offered in the present version. As a result, data relating
to the so-called Environmental Factors are stored in
the system.These propositional elements are essential
to contextualise the assessment of options chosen by
users in the next module.
(ii) The Option Choice Module presents proposals to
users relating to contractual clauses to be incorpo-
rated in the parenting plan. Most importantly, the
system assesses any options chosen by users in terms
of thewell-being of the child. Such assessment ismade
possible by the rule-based inference engine, which
takes as input the Environmental Factors introduced
by users and the options they choose, generating an
evaluation of these options as output. This part of
the system has been partially implemented [11]. The
development of this module is of central interest here.
(iii) The Option Deliberation Module enables users to
compare the options they have chosen and to enter
into a bargaining phase. If users can agree on a set of
contractual provisions, PPSS generates an agreement
(i.e., a parenting plan) as an output. This part of PPSS
exists only as a theoretical model (see [8, 9] for a
detailed description), and work is in progress on its
implementation. The functioning of this module is
not central to the present contribution.
(iv) The Explanation Module is a standard component
of expert systems, providing users with reasons for
system inferences and outputs.
One important element of the Option Choice Module is
a rule-based expert system for interpretation of the concept
of well-being of the child.This part of the system is of utmost
importance because, under Polish law, the parenting plan can
be accepted by the court only if that plan accords with the
criterion of well-being of the child. One of themain functions
of the system is to indicate to users whether the provisions
of their chosen agreement are in accordance with this crite-
rion, which remain an indeterminate concept. The relevant
literature identifies several types of indeterminateness of legal
concepts [13]: open-textured (where the emergence of new
situations in the world may change its initial boundaries);
contextual (where the meaning and scope of the concept
change with context); and evaluative (where investigations
concerning meaning and scope of legal concepts meaning
and scope depend significantly on the individual evaluations
of the agents involved). This indeterminateness raises the
question of how a concept of this type can be modelled
in an expert system. One obvious requirement is that the
system’s knowledge base should include a set of exemplary
cases, explaining both prototypical and borderline instances
of the concept’s application. This is perfectly embodied in
the Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) approach in the AI and
law literature, which emerged in the USA in the 1980s and
has continued to evolve [14–16], leading to the development
of hybrid systems that combine rule-based and case-based
elements [17]. Another important line of development relates
to the introduction of elements of teleological reasoning into
the knowledge base [18–20]. Although fruitful, these ideas
are not directly applicable to legal expert systems rooted in
continental legal culture (as opposed to common law culture),
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where there is no doctrine of binding precedent, and judges—
who often take a formalistic approach—are not inclined to
engage in discussion of the values underlying their decisions.
The PPSS knowledge base (presented in detail in [9])
encompasses, in particular, the following elements.
Options. These include any propositions that may form part
of the parenting plan. Options are grouped under Questions,
each of which provides for a set of options.The assumption is
that, in any developed agreement, one and only one Option
from each Question should be chosen.
Dimensions. PPSS contains a library of ten dimensions, each
related to one of the important broad issues (categories) that
inform the content of any parenting plan. More detailed
lists of the dimensions can be found in [9, 11]. Each dimen-
sion comprises a ten-step ordinal scale [0–9] (from least
favourable to most acceptable with respect to the well-being
of the child).
Environmental Factors (EFs). This set encompasses sentences
containing basic information about people involved in the
dispute, as well as a basic description of the case. Users
generate a concrete set of EFs by making choices in the
Questionnaire module of PPSS.
Defeasible Rules (DRs). As a generalised account of DRs
(modifiedwith respect to the earlier view presented in [9, 11]),
letDR(𝐷𝑖) be a set of defeasible rules assigned to aDimension
𝑖. A rule belongs to this set if and only if it has the following
form:
Ω 󳨐⇒ [0 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 9] (𝐷𝑖) , (1)
where
(i) Ω is a finite conjunctive formula encompassing ele-
ments from the set of options and EFs such that the
set of options includes at least one element (the set of
EFs may be empty);
(ii) [0 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 9](𝐷𝑖) is the valuation of the antecedent
of the DR in question with regard to one of the
dimensions of PPSS.
Defeasible rules are not rules in the traditionalmeaning of
this word (see, e.g., [6, 21]), nor are they (valuation) functions
because of their defeasibility. They are conditionals, in which
satisfaction of antecedents does not entail truthfulness of
a conclusion but establishes the level of estimation of a
given dimension. In other words, DRs adopt conjunctions of
options and EFs as their input and generate a value from the
ten-step ordinal scale as their output. It follows that the set
of defeasible rules within PPSS may be defined as a set of
relations adopting elements from the power set of the set of all
propositional elements (options and EFs) in the knowledge
base (PROP) as its domain and the elements of the set of
values (𝑉) encompassing the ten elements (from 0 to 9) as
its codomain:
DR = 𝑅 ⟨𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 (PROP) , V ∈ 𝑉⟩ . (2)
Additionally, we define a preference relation for the set of









, then, where both are applicable to a given factual
situation, the consequent of 𝑟
1
is derived and the consequent
of 𝑟
2
should be rejected. On that basis, the evaluation of a
given option can be performed in the following way.
For every option, a set of defeasible rules should be chosen
whose conditions are satisfied by a given case. If such set is
empty, the evaluation of that option cannot be performed; if
there is one rule, that rule becomes the preferred one; if there
is more than one rule, the preferred one should be chosen on
the basis of the orderORD. If preferred rules are chosen for all
options, the option attracting the highest level of evaluation
for a given dimension is optimal. Where users opt for other
solutions, they are informed of the suboptimal character of
their choice.
Forming the most important part of the Option Choice
Module, the inference engine operating on a knowledge
base generates assessments for users about the options they
have chosen in terms of its value for the well-being of the
child. As understood by the Polish judiciary and in the
literature on pedagogy and developmental psychology, this
is considered paramount. As explained in [10], users may
react in different ways to valuations provided by the system’s
inference engine; that is, they may agree or disagree with
the information provided by PPSS. In cases of disagreement
with the system’s suggestions, users may be asked to provide
grounds for their position by choosing one of the possible
answers suggested by the system. If the information provided
by PPSS is assessed as irrelevant by users (e.g., because
the contextual information stored in the knowledge base is
insufficient to grasp the actualities of the case), they may
engage in communication with each other by means of a
dialogue panel. The information provided by this module is
important for the process of negotiation because it informs
the parties about available alternatives to the negotiated
agreement.
Once sets of options have been chosen, parentsmaymove
to the next module of the system: the Option Deliberation
Module (ODM). Described in [8, 9], this module has not
yet been implemented but exists as a theoretical model. The
ODM enables users to check whether the options they have
chosen are within their space of agreement and to enter into
a bargaining phase. The system enables both manual and
semiautomated allocation of options, and users are asked to
assignnumerals to the disputed options (the sumof the points
assigned by each user is normalised to 100). PPSS favors those
allocations that maximise the equality of distribution of pre-
ferred options among users, once they do not violate the value
of well-being of the child. The eventual output of the system
is a proposal characterised by complete parental agreement.
3. Comparison of PPSS to Related Work and
Formulation of Research Problem
As outlined in the preceding section, PPSS is an online dis-
pute resolution (ODR) model that integrates three artificial
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intelligence techniques: NDSS (Negotiation Decision Sup-
port Systems), RbS (Rule-based Systems), and CBR (Case-
Based Reasoning) (see [22] for a general discussion of the
application of AI techniques in ODR systems). With regard
to the latter two components, PPSS acts as a classic expert
system, providing answers for users of the system concerning
the acceptability of their chosen parenting plan provisions in
terms of the indeterminate criterion of the child’s well-being.
In order to define the scope of the contribution of the PPSS
project, it is necessary to compare it to existing work in the
field.
The first important comparison is provided by work in
the field of Negotiation Support Systems. In the domain of
family law, the systems developed by Zeleznikow and his
collaborators, such as Family Winner [23], Asset Divider
[24], and IMODRE [25], came to prominence in the relevant
literature. The PPSS Option Deliberation Module (still a
theoretical model) performs functions similar to those of
the well-known Family Winner program. This latter system
is well known, assisting mediators and parties in family
disputes concerning the allocation of certain important items,
both monetary and nonmonetary (such as custody of the
child). Family Winner uses game theory and heuristics to
generate tradeoff maps, representing a party’s preferences
and tradeoffs. Items to be divided are entered by the users
themselves; the values that are taken into account in the
process of negotiations reflect the interests and preferences
of the negotiating parties. As noted by Abrahams et al.
[25], this facet of Family Winner has been discussed with
representatives of Victoria Legal Aid in Australia, and it was
suggested that the authors should incorporate the notion
of fairness in their further work, reflecting the paramount
interest of children. Inter alia, this led to the creation of
the Asset Divider program and a full-fledged multiagent
system called IMODRE, in which an Asset Divider-based
agent serves as one among many cooperating artificial
agents.
It is clear that the line of development of such systems pro-
ceeds from the classic Negotiation Support Systems paradigm
to incorporate elements of legal knowledge. The point of
departure for PPSS was exactly the opposite, structuring the
legal knowledge base relating to interpretation of the concept
of the well-being of children (similar to the paramount
interest of children in Australian family law) and leaving the
implementation of the NDSSmodule of the system for future
research. PPSS does not generally allow users to name issues
or items negotiated; instead, it requires parties to reflect on
all the important clauses of the potential parental agreement.
Such a methodological choice has serious consequences;
it is noted in the literature that Family Winner and Asset
Divider are, to a large extent, domain-independent [23,
26] while PPSS is obviously strictly domain-dependent, as
Environmental Factors, options, and defeasible rules will be
inapplicable to other domains of negotiation.
Given that the current work on PPSS focuses on the RbS
and CBR components rather than on the NSS, more detailed
comparison with existing solutions is not possible. It is worth
noting, however, that PPSS embodies the desiderata for ODR
environments as formulated by Lodder and Zeleznikow [27],
who suggest that such systems should be able to perform the
following functions:
(i) Calculating best alternatives to negotiated agreements
(BATNAs) for the parties.
(ii) Enabling the parties to communicate with each other
to discuss disputed issues in a process of dialogue.
(iii) Proposing how disputed items are to be allocated
among the parties.
Calculation of BATNAs and of other types of alter-
natives to negotiated agreements such as WATNAs (worst
alternatives to negotiated agreement) and MLATNAs (most
likely alternatives to negotiated agreement) is among the
most important topics in the development of NSS and ODR
tools in general (see, e.g., [28]). PPSS, which offers users an
assessment of their chosen options in relation to the legal
criterion of well-being of the child, advises divorcing parents
of how their preferred clauses are likely to be assessed by the
court and of the clauses that would be probably favoured by
the court. The presence of certain environmental factors may
also play a role in predicting judicial rulings in cases of lack
of agreement between spouses; for instance, where there has
been a history of violence towards the child by one of the
users, it is highly likely that their parental authority will be
limited or even refused.
As indicated, PPSS enables users to communicate with
each other. However, this is not the most important feature
of the system, as it focuses on a legal assessment of par-
ents’ preferred options more than on satisfaction of those
preferences. As noted earlier, PPSS also provides a module
for allocation of the discussed items (options). While the
desiderata formulated by Lodder and Zeleznikow are met,
PPSS places strong emphasis on legal assessment of the
deliberated agreement rather than onmechanisms to support
realisation of parties’ interests.
The output generated by PPSS might be interpreted as
advice for the involved parties or mediators. In this respect,
it may be compared to Split-Up (see, e.g., [29]), a well-known
decision support system used in family law cases involving
the division of marital property. An important difference
between PPSS and Split-Up is that while the latter is a hybrid
system, combining rule-based mechanisms and connection-
ist networks, PPSS exclusively uses traditional symbolic
propositional representations. This choice is dictated by the
educational function of PPSS, requiring that all steps of
inference performed by the program should be explicable to
the users to persuade them to follow partial items of advice,
leading eventually to the final output. Such functions cannot
be performed by subsymbolic connectionist representations,
which can however perform very fine-grained inferences,
thus providing adequate advice or accurate prediction. Here,
however, the aim is to explore the potential of classical hybrid
systems rather than the application of other technologies to
the problem.
On that basis, the most important comparators for the
PPSS project are the classical CBRandhybrid systems that use
representations based on dimensions and/or factors [14, 16,
17, 30, 31], as well as recent developments in the field of ODR
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that make extensive use of CBR inference mechanisms [32].
It should first be emphasised that the account of dimensions
employed in PPSS differs significantly from the classical
account presented in the HYPO system [16]. Briefly, HYPO
dimensions are complex knowledge representation structures
used to index cases and build arguments for or against the
disputant’s interest. These dimensions range from extremely
proplaintiff to extremely prodefendant. They enable the sys-
tem to retrieve cases similar to the case at issue (with respect
to the set of shared dimensions) and to compare those cases in
order to build analogy-based and distinguishing arguments,
as well as counterexamples. On the other hand, CATO-style
factors may or may not be present in a given case; if present,
they support the position of a given party. Both approaches
have their advantages and disadvantages, which cannot be
discussed in depth here (but see [33]). PPSS combines these
approaches, using both unary factors (Environmental Factors
have this characteristic) and dimensions. The differences
between HYPO and PPSS dimensions are as follows. Because
PPSS assigns one dimension to each category of the parenting
plan, each agreement will be indexed by every dimension
stored in the system. PPSS dimensions encompass sets of
propositional elements (Environmental Factors and options)
with a certain valuation on the given dimension. Because
each PPSS dimension involves a ten-step scale, it may be
defined as a set of ten sets of propositional elements; sets
belonging to a given step of the scale have the same valuation.
The construction and application of HYPO dimensions are
different because their role is to enable analogy-based argu-
mentation. In typical situations, then, only a few dimensions
will be present in a given case. HYPOdimensions also involve
different scales (binary, ordinal, etc.).
Most importantly, knowledge structures in the present
version of PPSS do not enable a fully fledged CBR, which
would encompass retrieval of cases, analogizing from one
case to another and forming arguments based on similarities
and differences. Instead, these structures serve to enhance
the contextualised character (Environmental Factors) and
systematisation (dimensions) of rule-based reasoning, per-
formed by means of defeasible rules in the assessment of
particular clauses of the parenting plan. The use of CBR
structures in PPSS differs considerably, then, from their use
in existing ODR projects such as UMCourt [32], in which the
information that constitutes a case encompasses the following
categories:
(i) Problem—encompassing the following information
types: background (similar to PPSS Environmental
Factors), objectives (aims of the parties), and legal (in
particular, applicable norms) and important dates in
the case.
(ii) Solutions—list of actions performed by the parties in
order to achieve the outcome.
(iii) Outcome—list of items describing the outcome in
terms of indemnities to be paid and a value denoting
the percentage of successful applications of this case
to the dispute resolution process.
UMCourt uses different types of similarity metrics for
retrieval of cases, including nearest neighbour and cosine
similarity. As an output, the user obtains a list of potentially
applicable cases, ordered in terms of their similarity. In
particular, if two cases are decided on the basis of the same
legal norm, those cases will be considered similar; elements
determining the similarity of legal cases may have different
weights.
Although this approach to the use ofCBR inODR systems
such as UMCourt is valuable, it has limited application to the
PPSS project because of the latter’s peculiarities. Specifically,
the role of PPSS is not to provide the parties with material for
arguments in favour of one or other side of the dispute but to
enable parents to draft a parenting planwhichwould optimise
realisation of the child’s well-being. It follows that results of
stored cases (in terms of winning or losing party) would not
be useful for the purposes of PPSS. Additionally, proximity of
dates will not always indicate cases’ similarity, as an old case
may well contain an adequate and applicable interpretation
of the child’s well-being. In respect of preparation of the
parenting plan, the governing legal normwill be derived from
art. 58 §1 and 1a of the PFCC, as referred to in Section 2,
whichmeans that retrieval of cases on the basis of similar legal
grounds would be trivial for PPSS.
In order to enhance PPSS with actual CBR tools, enabling
retrieval, comparison, and argument from cases, a different
approach is needed, in which the actual cases stored in the
database should contain as much information as possible
about interpretation of the concept of the child’s well-being in
the circumstances of the case. A first approach to this problem
may be found in the work of Araszkiewicz et al. [11], on the
basis of which the following questions can be asked:
(1) How should the relevant information for interpre-
tation of the child’s well-being in a given case be
represented in the knowledge base of the system?
(2) Howmight this information be applied to other cases,
given the limited applicability of both classic factor-
based and dimension-based approaches and recent
findings concerning the use of CBR in ODR systems?
Recall that the practical idea behind the knowledge
structure in the Option Choice Module of PPSS is that
parents interested in testing a certain option can obtain a
valuation of that option in terms of the child’s well-being,
based on Environmental Factors they have introduced. This
raises the question of how the setDR, as potentially applicable
to a given case, should be represented within the system.
An exhaustive approach would involve determining a finite
set of all propositional elements before deciding on the
valuation of each element of the set 𝑃(PROP). However,
this would be unfounded in terms of descriptive adequacy,
as it would be impossible to identify authoritative sources
(judgments or scientific works) to justify valuations for all
the possible inputs. For instance, if the set PROP encom-
passed 10 elements (a simple case), it would be necessary
to determine the valuation of 1024 (i.e., 210) rules and then
to define the preference relation for them. Such a valuation
would be almost completely arbitrary and computationally
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intractable. A further reason for rejecting this approach is
that the aim here is to model the reasoning of the courts
and the parties as faithfully as possible in relation to actual
instances of argumentation and to provide explanations that
are understandable by users. To that end, it is necessary to
determine a certain “reasonable” subset of 𝑃(PROP). The
present research questions are as follows:
(I) How can and should such a reasonable subset be
determined?
(II) What should be the syntax of the rule’s antecedents,
and how is a relation of preference between these rules
to be established?
In addressing these questions, the following general
problem provides a context for our investigations. Let us
assume that a researcher has succeeded in establishing an
appropriate knowledge base for a given case (C), encompass-
ing a reasonable set of defeasible rules, properly connected to
valuations and related to each other by relation of preference.
The present paper is concernedwith the incremental building
of such a generalised knowledge base, highlighting both the
possibilities and the limitations of that development.
4. The Issue of Uniqueness versus
Comparability of Cases from the Practical
Perspectives of Judge and Mediator
This section discusses the possibility of analogizing from one
case to another from the perspective of a lawyer or mediator.
It is our opinion that these sources may prove useful in
developingmore fine-grainedmethods for CBR inferences in
the interpretation of indeterminate concepts. In formulating
a directive to treat each case as unique, the commonplace
postulate concerning avoidance of routine in the work of a
judge, lawyer, or mediator by determination of its factual
and legal circumstances (known as diagnosis of the conflict)
should be assumed to be methodologically justified. This
conforms with the assumption that each human being is an
individual, capable of forming unique impressions, desires,
and relationships. Against earlier belief in the stable ratio-
nality of human motivations, judgments, and decisions, the
present state of the art in psychology points to nonschematic
patterns in the functioning of the human mind [34].
The influence of intuition, emotional style, heuristics,
and social interaction on the thinking and behaviour of
human beings means that parties to legal disputes are subject
to many cooccurring internal and external determinants.
These justify an individual approach to the investigation
of any case, taking into account both legal and extralegal
(i.e., psychological, communicational, relational, economic,
social, and ethical) points of view [35, 36]. At the same
time, the practice of law andmediation unambiguously shows
that, in taking this approach, it is advisable to (1) compare
different cases and disputes in their various aspects; (2) look
for any common elements, similarities, or concurrence in the
legal and factual features of these cases; (3) conduct com-
parative investigations concerning the motivations, needs,
reasoning, and argumentation of agents in different cases,
including those of intervening third persons (judges, arbiters,
and mediators); and (4) categorise the different aspects
of disputes. Such comparison fosters the optimisation and
application of individually and socially appropriate solutions.
A multicriteria analysis supporting diagnosis of the dispute
enhances interpretation of the concept of the child’s well-
being in the given situation and any application of judicial
and extrajudicial means in realising this value.
The analysed issue will seem obvious in democratic
countries governed by law, given the existence of formally
binding precedents and the stare decisis principle in common
law systems, as well as the paradigm of equal treatment of
citizens and the right to a fair trial in civil law systems.
The comparison of cases is additionally strengthened by the
principles of unity of interpretation and unified application
of the law within both domestic legal systems and the system
of law of the European Union [37]. Such a legal context
reinforces work in the fields of ODR and AI and law research
relating to amicable resolution of legal problems. It should
be emphasised that this conclusion not only pertains to AI-
enhanced systems but also is valid in relation to classical
mediation. Fairness of outcome, understood as a solution
generally accepted in similar situations, is perceived as an
important value by parties to disputes.
In the practice of mediation, conducted without the
obligatory evidentiary proceedings and qualification of the
facts of the case under a valid norm (subsumption), the issue
of similarity of cases gains a specific additional dimension.
In respecting the voluntary and autonomous character of
parties’ decisions concerning the conduct of negotiations and
the content of any decisions arising (including the agreement
itself), themediators (1) search for and compare common ele-
ments between the case in question and past cases (external
analysis) and (2) categorise important aspects of both subject
matter and agents in the present case (internal analysis).
The results of this comparison and categorisation enable
mediators to analyse the conflict and to propose solutions
that have been tested against past cases and are therefore
considered optimal. Categories enabling comparison of cases
and the application of adequate, verified solutions include the
following:
(1) Conflicts and causes (e.g., conflicts of relations, of
values, of factual investigations, of communication, or
of interest) [38].
(2) Framing of the dispute (e.g., as a matter of power,
of rights, of interests and needs, of aspirations, of
identity, or of conflict management) [39].
(3) Conflict-handlingmodes orways of dealingwith con-
flict (e.g., competing, collaborating, compromising,
avoiding, or accommodating) [40, 41].
(4) Preferred styles of decision-making (e.g., thinking
versus feeling) [42].
(5) Personality types of the parties (e.g., on the Myers
Briggs scale) [43].
(6) Course and degree of escalation of the dispute.
(7) Life, family, occupation, and social situation of the
parties.
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(8) Levels and types of needs of the parties [44].
(9) Psychological phase of the conflict (which is particu-
larly important in family disputes involving divorce)
[45].
(10) Evidentiary and legal positions of the parties.
Comparative analysis of present and past cases through
the prism of the above categories enables the mediator to
adequately apply experiences and findings. For instance,
appropriate identification and categorisation of the causes
of conflict guide the choice of an optimal solution and the
manner of the mediator’s intervention [37]. The ventilation
of emotions, method of negotiation, reality testing, and
argumentation applicable to a given category can also be
guided by approaches that have previously proved useful in
achieving mutual concessions and settlements. In practice, it
is also helpful to refer to agreements executed in similar cases,
especially where these have been empirically verified and
accepted by the courts. Analysis of similarities between cases
enables the mediator to use previous positive and negative
experiences to predict the likely behavior of the parties
and the effectiveness of any chosen means of intervention.
Additionally, professional development should emphasise
the common practice of anonymization of information
exchanged between negotiators, mediators, and lawyers con-
cerning precedents or untypical cases, as well as the need to
avoid error and to replicate tested and optimal solutions.
To conclude, while taking into account the individual and
unrepeatable character of any human being and their situa-
tion, not every case need be considered essentially unique.
Despite the diversity of human personalities, motivations,
needs, and modes of thinking and argumentation and of
the legal and factual features of cases, efficient comparison
and categorisation are in practice possible and justified. In
continental legal culture, such comparisons may at least
provide fruitful examples for analysis of the case at hand [46].
The categories of comparison listed above can fruitfully be
applied in developing the CBR module of PPSS.
5. Heuristics Used to Extract
Preferences among Rules from
Background Knowledge: General Remarks
and Discussion of the Literature
Having discussed the methods employed by lawyers and
mediators to compare cases and to categorise their important
elements, we may now consider how these insights can
fruitfully be employed in developing the PPSS knowledge
base. In the existing version of PPSS [11], both propositional
elements (options and environmental factors) and, in partic-
ular, defeasible rules (DR) and preferences between them are
predefined within the system.The following defines a context
for development of the automated generation of orderings
of rules within the constraints of resemblance to actual legal
argumentation (i.e., the generated rules should not be overly
complex) and computational features of the system.
The intention here is to model the reasoning of a judge
who must decide which case features should be counted as
more decisive, leading to an assessment of the case with
respect to the criterion of the well-being of the child. Such
determinations inform continuous updating of the meaning
and scope of the (indeterminate) concept of the child’s well-
being, although in civil law countries the impact of judicial
decisions on future cases is much weaker than in common
law jurisdictions, where past cases have the status of binding
precedent. In the absence of such authoritative sources, both
parties to the drafting of parenting plans and judges assessing
those plans on the criterion of well-being of the child must
use different heuristics to assess the relative importance of
features of the analyzed cases. As different people may use
different heuristics in addressing a given cognitive problem,
it would be implausible to advance a set of universally used
heuristics.The selection presented below is therefore to some
extent arbitrary and clearly nonexhaustive. It was developed
on the basis of the authors’ experience of both theory and
practice of legal cases involving family disputes within the
framework of Polish law.
Most obviously, a heuristic may be defined as a non-
algorithmic problem-solving strategy (locus classicus [46]).
In framing the PPSS knowledge base, we are less interested
in the process of decision-making under uncertainty than
in the process of grasping the important features of the
analysed case and assessing their relative importance with
regard to the criterion of well-being of the child. Given the
defeasible character of reasoning based on heuristics, it is
always possible that this may lead to a fallacious decision in
concrete cases, accounting for the possible disagreement of
PPSS users with suggestions and valuations provided by the
system [47]. Our aim is to develop a knowledge base that will
decrease the likelihood of such disagreements.
Some of the main heuristics used in determining prefer-
ence relations between defeasible rules to interpret aspects
of the concept of the child’s well-being may be classified as
follows.
(1) Subjective Decision of the Agent Deciding on the Relation
of Preference. In such situations, establishing a relation of
preference between rules is based on arbitrary or intuitive
choices. In some instances, in the absence of any accessible
source from which derive the preference relation and the
grounds for establishing it, an arbitrary choice may be the
only available option.
(2) The Law (in the Broad Sense of the Term), Encompassing
Statutory Sources, Case Law, and Doctrinal Elaborations. In
particular, judicial decisions are a rich source in establishing
preference relations between rules for the interpretation of
indeterminate legal concepts. However, in civil legal systems,
the rules expressed in judicial decisions cannot generally be
considered binding and cannot therefore strictly constrain
the decision-making processes of interested parties or of the
court. In these circumstances, relative preference relations
between rules encompassing features of cases expressed in
judicial decisions in civil law countries can be seen as no
more than weak constraints on reasoning in new cases.
Even striking similarities between new and old cases do not
warrant application of the previously expressed preference
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relation, although they may in practice provide good reason
for its application.
(3) Commonsense Reasoning. This provides an abundance of
heuristics, applicable to a potentially infinite number of cases.
In the first place, commonsense reasoning may play a neg-
ative role by eliminating absurd or unreasonable preference
relations between rules and subsequently a positive role in
seeking an ordering of rules that appears “most reasonable.”
Clearly, these heuristics may lead to defeasible results.
(4) Appeals to Morality and/or Teleological Reasoning. This
type of heuristic enables an agent to argue that rule 𝑟
1
is preferred over rule 𝑟
2
, for example, because the former
realises a more important value or because it realises some
given value to a greater extent. Background knowledge
related to values is a source of heuristics under the concept
of balancing; generally speaking, a rule may be assessed as
the preferred one where its application leads to the most
favourable balancing of relevant values.The idea of balancing
values naturally assumes that the realisation of one valuemay
to some extent limit the possibility of fully realising other
values. As the child’s well-being should itself be treated as
a value, we refer here to a set of lower-level values or goals
that may contribute to the realisation of this paramount value
(e.g., good communication between parents and children,
good financial situation, or children’s safety). In fact, these
lower-level values are represented in particular dimensions
of PPSS, although in a distributed manner.
There is an abundant literature (in AI, AI and law, and
legal theory) concerning the establishment of preferences
between arguments based on rules and comparison of sets
of reasons in rule-based reasoning. For obvious reasons, it
is not possible to discuss all these research streams in depth
here. Instead, we will focus on selected relevant works to
demonstrate how our approach contributes to the state of
the art. It is important to emphasise that the problem of
establishing preference relations between conflicting legal
rules is beyond the scope of our investigations, which focus
on relative preferences in the assessment of a given factual
situation from the point of view of a single indeterminate
legal criterion, in this case, the concept of well-being of the
child.
In terms of general research on AI and argumentation,
there exists a vast literature on preference-based argumen-
tation. This work focuses on formal properties of developed
theories, often within the frame of abstract argumentation.
This idea has been introduced to a wider audience by Dung
[48] and in theories concerning structured or instantiated
argumentation. For instance, Modgil and Prakken [5] have
recently presented a fully fledged account of argumentation
with preferences, rooted in Dung’s theory but capable of
expressing a wide range of instantiations by means of the
ASPIC+ formalism. Although this line of research is of great
importance, its relevance for PPSS is limited at this stage
of the system’s development, as PPSS does not allow users
to argue about relative preferences for rules by means of a
computational model of argumentation. Rather, the aim of
the PPSS inference engine is to infer the correct valuation of
the given case and to present it to users of the system, with
suggestions for changes to chosen options.
Another important precedent informing PPSS is the
model of teleological reasoning incorporating cases and
values developed by Bench-Capon and Sartor [19], which
was designed to build theories of cases from background
knowledge (encompassing, inter alia, cases and factors) and
to evaluate those theories against a criterion of coherence.
Although PPSS does not employ the notion of theory, an
important aspect of that model for the PPSS knowledge base
is the set of heuristics (referred to as “theory constructors”)
used to infer certain theoretical elements from background
knowledge. In particular, Bench-Capon and Sartor discuss
procedures for the extraction of value preferences from cases,
as well as rule preferences based on value preferences. In the
present version of PPSS, there are no rules that would enable
the system to abduct value preferences from the ordering of
rules in cases.This is problematic because the formalistic and
magisterial style of the Polish courts often makes it difficult
to reconstruct the details of teleological reasoning. However,
the existence of such considerations in certain judgments
stored in the PPSS database opens the possibility of extending
the inference engine in this way. In summary, it should be
stressed that the heuristic character of establishing preference
relations between rules in PPSS should be seen as (possibly
justified) advice to users rather than as an authoritative
solution.
6. Selected Technical Issues
It seems important to point out two disadvantages of the
model presented in previous versions [11] of PPSS: the
lack of discussion of possible utilisation of negation in
the conditional part of defeasible rules and the necessity
for manual extraction of defeasible rules’ preferences. This
section will address these problems, suggesting a first step
towards automation of the process.
The problem of negation is of particular importance
because, at the first sight, it is difficult to imagine a legal
decision support system with no possibility of negation,
given that negation appears so frequently in both legal
and commonsense rules. Generally speaking, two kinds of
negation may be distinguished in formal logic as follows:
(i) Classical (strong) negation (denoted by ¬) in the
conditional part of the rule is fulfilled if it is known
that a given proposition is not true.
(ii) Negation as failure (denoted by ∼) is fulfilled if every
possible proof of a given proposition fails.
If we allow for utilisation of both kinds of negation in the
conditional part of the rule, we may use a construction like
∼ ¬𝑃, usually interpreted as “it is not known that not 𝑃.”
In [3], Sergot et al. describe a legal expert system that
models the British Nationality Act, in which they use only
negation as failure.The problem of double negations (includ-
ing one classical negation) was solved by changing a negative
literal (“X was not born in the UK”) into a positive one (“X
was born outside the UK”). From another point of view,
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many other logical models of legal reasoning [21] allow for
utilisation of both kinds of negation. Other expert systems
(such as that used for evaluation of the quality of protection of
IT systems [49]) allow for utilisation of negation as failure in
the conditional part of the rule only and for classical negation
in the consequence part of the rule.
It is important to understand which kind of negation (if
any) is most suited for modelling defeasible rules in PPSS.
Utilisation of negation as failure seems more flexible, and
Sergot et al. [3] use it in their system. However, in the
specific legal context of rules for evaluating the well-being
of a child, where the chosen option has a positive character,
the existence of environmental factors must be justified. Even
the negated factor (e.g., “no cooperation between parents”)
should be explicitly stated and strictly justified on the basis
of evidence, making negation as failure unnecessary in this
specific kind of legal rule. Moreover, as in [3], classical
negation may be replaced by positive propositions or by
propositions such as “no cooperation,” which may be treated
in the same way as ordinary positive propositions. To bear on
an assessment of options chosen by the negotiating parents, a
lack of certain circumstances should be asserted as a “positive
fact.” Such a conception of defeasible rules has interesting
consequences, which will be discussed later.
It is trivial to say that a legal expert system incorporating
an Explanation Module should accurately reflect the reason-
ing of a human lawyer. Defeasible rules in PPSS should also
mirror rules by which a human actor evaluates the influence
on one of the dimensions representing the well-being of the
child of a chosen option and the context of a case as described
by a set of factors. The same option in a different context
may vary in its influence on a given dimension, making it
important to choose the rule referring to the context at hand.
This is important because the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of one particular factor can critically alter evaluation of a
given dimension.
Example 1. Let us consider two defeasible rules from the
example presented in [11] as follows:
𝑟
1
: 𝛼 ∧ 𝛿 ∧ 𝛾 ⇒ 3.
𝑟
3






When 𝛼, 𝛿, and 𝛾 are options, ef2 is environmental factor.
In our case, if we assume that factor ef2 exists and we
choose all three options (𝛼 ∧ 𝛿 ∧ 𝛾), the conditions of both
rules will be satisfied, leading to a conflict. How can such a
conflict be resolved? There are two possible ways; the first of
these is to add the possibility of negation (negation as failure)
of the condition of the rule, with additional conditions to rule
𝑟
1




: 𝛼 ∧ 𝛿 ∧ 𝛾∧ ∼ ef2 ⇒ 3.
𝑟
3






Such a solution has one important disadvantage; rule 𝑟
1
(as well as 𝑟
3
) should also contain clauses excluding other
factors that can alter evaluation of a chosen option. In real-
life situations, theremay be a number of such clauses, making
such a rule counterintuitive and difficult to understand.
The second way to overcome the problem of conflicting
rules is to assume that, in cases of conflict between two (or





: 𝛼 ∧ 𝛿 ∧ 𝛾 ⇒ 3.
𝑟
3






There is a long history of ordering rules in formal models
of legal reasoning. However, our case is specific. First, we
must detect which rules are in conflict. Unlike advanced
models of reasoning and argumentation, only one defeasible
rule can be used in our model to evaluate the level of
promotion of a given dimension. It follows that if a given
case satisfies the conditions of more than one rule, then
all these rules are in conflict. Second, we have to discover
and justify the sources of order between conflicting rules.
There may be many such roots, from legal principles like lex
specialis, lex superior, or lex posterior; they may also come
from preferences between values.These issues are extensively
discussed in the literature, as, for instance, those in Sartor
[50]. The case described in the above example is interesting
because every case satisfying the conditions of rule 𝑟
3
also
satisfies the conditions of rule 𝑟
1
. On that basis, we may say
that the conditional part of rule 𝑟
1
subsumes the conditional
part of rule 𝑟
3
. How are we to deal with such cases? The
most intuitive way is to observe that rule 𝑟
3
should be treated
as an exception to the more general rule 𝑟
1
, and so, on the
basis of the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali (in
which the specific act (provision) derogates from (prevails
over) the general regulation [50]), we may assume that 𝑟
3
is preferred to 𝑟
1
. Here, we are using this collision rule
analogically, as the rules employed in PPSS will rarely have a
strictly legal character; rather, they are “judicially authorised”
commonsense rules, used by courts in issuing opinions.
Of course, conflict may arise not only between rules with
subsuming conditional parts; in such situations, preference
relations between rules should be built on the basis of the
other justifications. It is our opinion that conflict resolution
by the ordering of rules seems more intuitive and better
reflects human reasoning; for that reason, a generalisation
and formalisation of this method are offered below.
On the basis of the above and [11], the following new
elements can be added.









∈ DR(𝐷𝑖)) assigned to a Dimension 𝑖, and there
exists a case that satisfies conditional parts of both of them,
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On the basis of the above definition of conflict, we can
create a conflict resolution method based on the analogical
application of the collision rule of lex specialis as widely
applied in the context of conflict between statutory rules. By
applying this method, we can automatically add a new order
to a set ORDC that allows us to defeat conflicting and less
preferred rules.





(i) Ω is a conditional part of the rule 𝑟
𝑥
, which is a
conjunction of options chosen by the parents (Ω
𝑋1
)




(ii) the rule 𝑟
𝑦





is a finite conjunctive formula encompass-
ing elements taken from the set of EFs,
then rule 𝑟
𝑦
is preferred to rule 𝑟
𝑥





should be added to ORDC.




, then the conclusion of 𝑟
𝑦
rather than the conclusion of 𝑟
𝑥
is counted as true in a given
factual situation.
The above definitions require some additional comments.
As the conditional part of defeasible rules is a conjunctive
formula of positive propositions, creating a new rule by
adding a new condition to an existing rule will narrow its
scope. Such a new rule can be treated as a special exception to
the old one; on the basis of the principle of lex specialis, then,
it should take higher priority in cases of conflict than the old
one. This is illustrated in Example 6.




: 𝛼 ∧ 𝛿 ∧ 𝛾 ⇒ 3.
𝑟
3






Set ORDC is empty: ORDC = 0.
Let us assume that, in our case, environmental factor ef2






If we substitute Ω for the formula (𝛼 ∧ 𝛿 ∧ 𝛾), then both
our rules will take the following forms:
𝑟
1
: Ω ⇒ 3.
𝑟
3
: Ω ∧ ef2 ⇒ 0.
As the conditions of application of lex specialis are




to set ORDC, thus resolving
the conflict.
The model of lex specialis presented above enables avoid-
ance of a special kind of conflict that may appear in the set of
defeasible rules. Of course, it does not allow resolution of all
possible conflicts that might appear in the DR set. If such a
conflict appears, one of the other heuristics should be used to
resolve it.
7. Conclusions
Despite impressive progress in the field of development of
legal expert systems, it remains far from clear how such sys-
tems should be developed to make them useful in practice, in
dealing with nontrivial cases. The present paper contributes
to this line of research in a very specific context defined by
the conjunction of the following elements: (1) continental
legal culture, where there is no precedential constraint; (2)
nonadversary proceedings, where parties are motivated to
cooperate rather than to argue against each other butmay still
have diverging interests; and (3) highly indeterminate, as in
the open-textured and evaluative concept of the well-being of
the child.
Our main findings are as follows. It would be computa-
tionally intractable and descriptively inadequate to seek to
apply exhaustive algorithms to interpret the well-being of
the child by means of classical hybrid rule-based and case-
based knowledge representation structures. To provide users
with an explanation of outputs that simulates the reasoning
of an actual lawyer or mediator, certain heuristics should be
applied to provide defeasible rules interpreting this concept in
concrete cases, as well as preferences between these rules. It is
unnecessary to utilise any form of negation in the syntactical
structure of these rules; the specificity of description of the
case in the antecedent of the given rule provides a very
convenient heuristic for establishing priorities between rules.
As a matter of course, this proposal is subject to debate, not
least because the specificity of rules utilised here falls within
the domain of commonsense rather than of strictly legal rules.
In particular, effective utilisation of the specificity principle
requires the knowledge of engineering to structure the system
of environmental factors to establish a hierarchy of more
general concepts and exceptions thereof. The limitations of
this approach will be the subject of future investigations
relating to the PPSS project.
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